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Executive Summary
Historically, the US relationship with the GCC countries has been largely de-
fined in terms of security and energy issues. However, in recent years the US 
dollar and its influence on the currency systems in the Gulf have taken on 
increased importance. For years the GCC countries have pegged their curren-
cies to the dollar, setting their currencies at a fixed rate with respect to the 
dollar. This practice paid great dividends in helping the individual countries 
establish sound macroeconomic fundamentals, especially as defined in terms 
of low rates of domestic inflation. However, the system comes at the cost of 
precluding the use of monetary policy, particularly the setting of domestic 
interest rates that diverge from those in the United States. 
A close examination of the pros and cons of the current fixed exchange rate 
system suggest that the time for change to a more flexible system may be at 
hand. For various reasons, however, GCC countries have decided to maintain 
the status quo, at least in the near term. 
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In the past week Iran’s president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, has 
damned it as a ‘worthless piece of paper’ and China’s premier, Wen 
Jiabao, has moaned that it is causing his country ‘big pressure’. The 
dollar’s relentless decline—it hit a new low of $1.49 against the 
euro on November 21st—is prompting jibes from America’s critics, 
jangling investors’ nerves and giving policymakers headaches.1 
Currency systems are like marriage: whichever one you find 
yourself in you think another one might be better.2
INTRODUCTION
Throughout most of 2007, hardly a week went by without a new reason to be con-
cerned about the fate of the US dollar. Toward the latter part of the year, the distress-
ing news broke that key members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the UAE 
and Qatar in particular, might abandon linking their currencies with the dollar. Such 
an event would reduce the overall demand for the dollar and place even more down-
ward pressure on it. Many experts believed that the GCC’s delinking from the besieged 
currency might even precipitate a mass exodus to the euro or even the Chinese yuan.
With the exception of Kuwait, which switched to a currency basket in May of 2007, 
all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries maintain dollar pegs. The reason for 
the dollar peg is straightforward. The United States is one of the GCC’s biggest trading 
partners. Crude oil is traded globally in dollars. GCC governments earn and spend in 
dollars. Most of the estimated 41.5 trillion public sector assets in the Gulf are dollar-
denominated, and the booming project market is backed by dollar lending.
Pegging local GCC currencies to the dollar has been a long-standing practice. 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for example, have had USD pegs since June 1986 and Janu-
ary 1978, respectively, and, for the most part, dollar pegs have worked well for them 
as the sole nominal anchor for inflation control. Similarly, before July 2005, China 
had a de facto dollar peg for 11 years (since January 1994), for exactly the same rea-
son.3 However, with the prolonged fall in the dollar since early 2000, the picture has 
changed dramatically. On average, GCC member countries’ currencies have declined 
on average 30-40% against the euro, making non-dollar imports significantly more ex-
pensive. In the three years ending December 2005, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) estimates that the real value of the Saudi riyal fell by about 18%, even as the real 
price of oil nearly tripled.4 
For the region as a whole, the effect has been to reduce individual purchasing 
power significantly, since dollar denominated goods from the United States account 
1. “The Dollar: Time to Break Free,” The Economist, November 22, 2007, http://www.economist.com/
opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10177927.
2. George Soros, quoted in Peter Wilson and Henry Ng Shang Ren, “The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
and the Volatility of Exchange Rates after the Asian Crisis: A Counterfactual Analysis,” The World Economy, Vol. 
30, No. 11, November 2007, p. 1646.
3. Stephen Jen, “Dollar Peggers to Stretch the ‘Impossible Trinity,’” Morgan Stanley Global Economic Forum, 
September 28, 2007, http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070928-Fri.html.
4. Digby Lidstone, “Fixed Ideas,” Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 50, No. 39, September 29, 2006, pp. 
4-5.
Looney.indd   1 1/7/2008   8:51:06 AM
Currency Conundrums in the Gulf                 	 	 	 2
for only about 10% of both GCC exports and imports.5 The pegged exchange rate 
and falling value of the dollar have also been cited as one of the causes of increased 
labor unrest, especially in Dubai where many foreign workers are being impover-
ished by the combination of rising local prices and the falling dollar. As one account 
described the situation in late 2007: 
Usually, migrant laborers in the UAE are paid in dirhams, the 
local currency that is pegged to the dollar. As the value of the 
dollar falls, workers grow increasingly desperate as the buying 
power of their wages dwindles. As inflation in the UAE creeps 
towards 10 per cent, the workers’ hopes of saving money are 
dashed. Without a pay rise, the workers say that they can no 
longer afford to support relatives back home — the reason that 
overwhelmingly draws them here in the first place. The jobs that 
once seemed lucrative now feel like a waste of time, they say. 
Many believe that they would be better off to cut their losses and 
return to India or Pakistan, where the local currency is looking 
increasingly attractive. 6 
The rumors of a change in GCC exchange rate policies began in May 2007, when 
Kuwait shifted its peg with the dollar to one of a basket of currencies (with the dollar 
still accounting for 70-80% of the value). Although the shift amounted to only a 1% 
revaluation, Kuwait’s action ignited speculation that several or all of the other GCC 
countries might either revalue or delink their currencies from the dollar.7
The currency issue came to a head when the heads of state of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council met in Doha, Qatar on December 3, 2007 to discuss whether or not 
to alter their existing dollar pegs. According to a report entitled Gulf Currencies, 
Change Needed and Likely, written before the meeting by Gerard Lyons and Marios 
Maratheftis at Standard Chartered: “A revaluation of the GCC currencies is needed 
now and the region should begin preparations to shift their currencies away from 
a peg to the dollar to managing their currencies against a basket of currencies with 
which the Gulf trades.” 8
Lyons and Maratheftis went on to suggest that: “This shift in currency pegs is 
needed not only to reflect the present vulnerable state of the dollar, but more impor-
tantly to help position the region’s economy for both the cyclical and structural shifts 
that it is undergoing.” In the past, the GCC’s dollar peg has brought benefits. “The 
decision to peg their currencies to the dollar achieved credibility by tying the region’s 
monetary policy to that of the US Fed, and also achieved certainty in the minds of the 
general public. There is, however, a cyclical challenge,” Lyons and Maratheftis add: 
5. “Gulf States: Conflict Over Currency Revaluation Fro��en,” Oxford Analytica, December 7, 2007
6. Sonia Verma, “Dark Side of Dubai’s Economic Boom Exacts Harsh Human Toll,” London Times, 
November 3, 2007, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/markets/the_gulf/article2796513.ece.
7. Lidstone, “Fixed Ideas,” pp. 4-5.
8. Gerard Lyons and Marios Maratheftis, Gulf Currencies: Change Needed and Likely (London: Standard 
Chartered, November 15, 2007), http://www.standardchartered.com/media-centre/press-releases/2007/
documents/grp_20071115a.pdf.
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As the UK found to its cost when it was tied to Germany and the 
Deutsche Mark in Europe’s Exchange Rate Mechanism in the early 
1990s, once there is a disconnect between the policies needed at 
the center of the system and those needed elsewhere then problems 
develop. A similar episode, albeit different in scale is now being 
seen in the Gulf. Whilst the US is cutting interest rates in response 
to a slowing economy the Gulf needs a tighter monetary policy 
to curb inflation. And, even though the Gulf is deepening and 
developing its capital markets, it does not yet have sophisticated 
enough capital markets to sterili��e or neutrali��e the local build up 
of liquidity – which of course continues as the region booms and 
oil prices stay high.9
Despite such calls for action, the December 3-4 Gulf Summit ended without any 
change in the dollar peg. Asked whether GCC member states would de-peg their cur-
rencies on their own, Saudi Arabia’s Finance Minister Ibrahim Al Assaf told reporters 
that if the countries did it they would do it as a block. However, conflicting informa-
tion from many GCC leaders is fanning the flames of speculation. Recent announce-
ments from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar have indicated their wish 
to abandon the dollar. Yet statements made during the leaders’ summit have leaned 
towards keeping the currency pegged until the group’s monetary union is formed in 
2010. 
Still, the exchange rate issue remains and is unlikely to go away anytime soon. Is it 
time, as suggested above, for the GCC countries to seriously consider breaking their 
currency pegs with the dollar? To shed some light on this important issue, the sections 
below outline the main issues surrounding the current currency debates. First, how 
does the current pegged system work? Second, what is the rationale for maintaining 
the existing system, at least in the near term? Third, what are the main costs in main-
taining the status quo? Fourth, which of the alternatives above appear best suited to 
the member country’s needs at this point in time? Finally, with these considerations 
in mind, what might we expect the GCC countries to do with regard to their exchange 
rates over the next several years? 
WORkINGS OF THE DOLLAR PEG SySTEM
The most often cited advantage of pegging to the dollar is that it allows an emerg-
ing economy — especially one with weak economic and political institutions — to 
quickly build confidence in its currency by adopting the relatively inflation-free mon-
etary policy of the United States.10 
 The operational workings of the peg are fairly straightforward11 — to support 
the peg, all a country needs to do is have enough foreign currency to be able to buy 
and sell its currency at the fixed exchange rate. Using Saudi Arabia as an example, to 
9. Lyons and Maratheftis, Gulf Currencies, pp. 1-2.
10. Brad Setser, “The Case for Exchange Rate Flexibility in Oil-Exporting Economies” (Washington: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2007), Policy Brief PB07-8, p. 1, http://www.iie.com/
publications/pb/pb07-8.pdf.
11. The following draws on Brad Bourland, The Riyal’s Peg to the Dollar (Riyadh: Jadwa Investment, August 
2007).
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support the peg the central bank (SAMA) holds by law sufficient “foreign exchange 
convertible to gold” (principally short-term US dollar instruments) to cover the value 
of all printed riyals in circulation, the part of money supply known as “MO.” In fact, 
today SAMA holds foreign currency-denominated assets far in excess of that required 
to provide 100% coverage of the currency.12
Advocates of the peg note that it has served its purpose in providing stability. In 
terms of internal stability, inflation in Saudi Arabia averaged a negligible 0.5% per 
annum between 1986 and 2006. External stability is measured by the “real effective 
exchange rate,” which takes into account the value of the riyal against the currencies of 
Saudi Arabia’s main trade partners. According to the IMF, the real effective exchange 
rate has been relatively stable apart from periods of significant dollar weakness in 
1986-1987 and 2002-2005.
While the overall record of the Saudi riyal’s peg to the dollar has been excellent, 
problems have occurred: 
Oil market developments have occasionally led to pressure on the 
peg. In 1993 falling oil prices, combined with concerns about the 
budget and current accounts deficits, generated money market 
speculation that the riyal would be devalued. Similar speculation 
occurred during late 1998 and early 1999 owing to a combination 
of falling oil prices and an economic crisis in Asia that caused major 
exchange rate devaluations in that region. At that time, SAMA 
successfully intervened in the foreign exchange markets with its 
vast foreign asset position to maintain the stability of the riyal.13 
THE CASE FOR MAINTAINING THE PEG
No doubt the Saudi position at the December 2007 Council of Ministers meeting 
was the decisive factor in the GCC’s decision not to alter the exchange rate system at 
that time. As for the future, Saudi Arabia will likely remain the biggest advocate of 
maintaining the pegged exchange rate:14 
•	 Saudi Arabia is not only generally the most conservative 
state in the GCC, but also the most deeply invested in its security 
partnership with Washington. 
•	 The Saudi commitment to dollar-based oil wealth recycling 
goes back to high-level bilateral agreements in the 1970s, which 
ushered in a period of unprecedented technical and economic 
cooperation. 
•	 As a relatively populous state with large fiscal commitments, 
the kingdom has a specific interest in keeping the value of its 
overseas reserves as high as possible.
12. Bourland, The Riyal’s Peg to the Dollar, p. 2.
13. Bourland, The Riyal’s Peg to the Dollar, p. 3.
14. “Gulf States: Conflict Over Currency Revaluation Fro��en,” Oxford Analytica, December 7, 2007
Looney.indd   4 1/7/2008   8:51:07 AM
Currency Conundrums in the Gulf          	 	 	 5
•	 A riyal appreciation would decrease the value of its assets, 
which have been estimated to be 75% dollar-denominated. 
•	 A Saudi movement away from the dollar could trigger a panic, 
which could further undermine both the value of overseas assets 
and the global economic system. 
In addition, many economists in Saudi Arabia emphasi��e the high costs associated 
with either abandoning the peg altogether or letting the currency revalue in a man-
aged float. The losers in such action are easily identified:15 
The government: Oil revenues are earned in dollars and converted into riyals 
for budgetary spending. A revaluation would permanently impair the riyal value of 
oil revenues, reducing the si��e of the current budget surplus and accelerating the day 
when the budget falls into deficit. The value of the government’s mostly dollar-de-
nominated foreign assets, currently in excess of $240 billion when converted into ri-
yals, would also be reduced considerably with a significant revaluation. 
The Central Bank (SAMA): SAMA has stated repeatedly and forcefully that there 
would be no change to the 21-year-old exchange rate peg. Any move would, therefore, 
damage SAMA’s credibility and reduce confidence in the currency in the event of an 
oil price downturn or increase in the value of the dollar. Moreover, no central bank 
wants a sudden and sharp adjustment to the exchange rate, but small changes would 
have little impact on those hit by dollar weakness. 
Foreign investors: A more expensive riyal and the introduction of exchange rate 
uncertainty would discourage foreign investment, thus reducing much needed tech-
nology transfer. As the government is considering opening its capital market to for-
eign investors, a revaluation would make that more costly.
Local companies: Revaluation of the riyal would undermine Saudi efforts at di-
versification away from oil — the “Dutch Disease” effect.16 Saudi companies that cur-
rently export or hope to export in the near future would see their products become 
more expensive overseas, making them less competitive. Those whose goods compete 
with imports, such as many food products, building materials, and furniture, would 
suffer as imported products became cheaper. 
There are several additional arguments against a revaluation of the Saudi riyal:17
•	 Inflation would not be completely addressed. Price rises in the 
kingdom are mainly domestically generated. Imported inflation 
accounts for about 35% of total inflation. A large part of this is 
food-related, which is a global phenomenon, not just a Saudi 
one. A revaluation will not necessarily help reduce these costs to 
consumers.
15. Bourland, The Riyal’s Peg to the Dollar, Part 1.
16. Serhan Cevik, “A Dutch Disease in Arabia,” Morgan Stanley, Global Economic Forum, October 19, 2006, 
http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2006/20061019-Thu.html.
17. John Sfakianakis, “Why Saudi Arabia is Right Not to Revalue,” Financial Times, October 11, 2007, p. 11, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/92d94ba6-24e4-11d8-81c6-08209b00dd01,print=yes,id=071011000075.html.
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•	 Today’s revaluation could be tomorrow’s devaluation, 
which would make the kingdom’s currency regime less credible. 
International investors might view this currency uncertainty 
unfavorably as they assess risks.
•	 One revaluation could lead to subsequent ones, which could 
eventually put the peg into question. 
In sum, the Saudis, as well as advocates of the dollar peg in other GCC countries, 
stress the fact that costs associated with a revaluation are likely to be considerable. 
Peg advocates implicitly assume that any possible benefits associated with improved 
macroeconomic stabili��ation and increased purchasing power for average Saudis are 
likely to be relatively low. Perhaps in the future, as the economy becomes more di-
versified, domestic financial markets deepen, and the central bank develops viable 
monetary policy instruments, a more flexible exchange rate might make sense. How-
ever, that time has not arrived, and changing the exchange rate prematurely would 
do more harm than good. 
CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED By THE PEG
While there is little doubt the pegged exchange rate system has served Saudi Ara-
bia and the other GCC countries well in the past, critics are quick to point out that 
pegs come at a high cost — specifically, the loss of an independent monetary policy. 
Economic theory postulates that targeting an exchange rate and maintaining an in-
dependent monetary policy with an open capital account to be an “impossible trin-
ity” (i.e., two of these three objectives can be achieved, but not all three at the same 
time).18 
It follows that countries pegged to the US dollar must follow the monetary poli-
cies in that country. If they have business cycles that are in sync with that of the US, 
the appropriate monetary policies in these countries should be similar to those of the 
US, and changes in the Fed’s policy should not really cause complications. However, 
if these countries diverge from the US economy’s business cycle, as is currently the 
case, then monetary policy that is good for the US will not be appropriate for these 
countries. 
The necessity of similar monetary policies in the GCC to those in the United 
States under the peg stems from the fact that to maintain a pegged exchange rate 
GCC central banks are forced to follow the interest rates moves of the US Federal 
Reserve. Any significant deviation in rates would lead to arbitrage by currency trad-
ers placing strain on the peg and possibly inviting destabili��ing speculation, such as 
occurred in 1997 with the collapse of the Thai baht. 
The relevant question for the GCC countries is at what point the advantages of 
the stability and certainty of the peg are less than the costs associated with their 
inability to stabili��e the domestic economy through pursuing an independent mon-
etary policy. For years, the issue was somewhat moot because the GCC countries did 
not have either the monetary expertise or the financial market sophistication neces-
18. For a description and examples of the trilemma problem see Michael Frenkel and Lukas Menkhoff, 
“An Analysis of Competing IMF Reform Proposals,” Intereconomics, May/June 2000, pp. 107-113. 
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sary to pursue an independent monetary policy. This may no longer the case.
PROBLEMS IN RESPONDING TO INFLATIONARy PRESSURES
Currently the US is lowering interest rates to stave off a recession. The appropriate 
policy for combating inflation in the GCC is higher interest rates. 
The GCC members’ difficulty in combating inflation is compounded by the weak-
ening of their currencies as the dollar depreciates in international currency markets. 
The effect is to amplify the inflationary effects stemming from the increase in world 
food prices. Much of the pressure is from rising world food prices, which are a bulky 
item in consumer price indices.19 Clearly, the inflationary impact of rising interna-
tional food prices combined with a depreciating dollar will vary from country to 
country depending on the composition of its imports. Similarly, varying fiscal rates of 
expansion, together with structural differences have created several unique patterns 
of inflation among the GCC countries (Figure 1 and Table 1): 
•	 Low inflation group with relatively low single digit inflation: 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain where the inflation rates 
in recent years have been in the 2-3% range. 
•	 High inflation group: Qatari and UAE rates have reached 
9-12%. Given that these rates are considerably above that of the 
other group, excessive domestic demand is likely to have played a 
significant role in accelerating the recent price increases. 
Table 1: Inflation in the GCC Countries, 2000-2008 (Average Annual Rates of Growth)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Bahrain -0.7 -1.2 -0.5 1.7 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.7
Kuwait 1.6 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.3 4.1 2.8 2.6 2.6
Oman -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.9 3.2 3.8 3.5
Qatar 1.7 1.4 0.2 2.3 6.8 8.8 11.8 12.0 10.0
Saudi 
Arabia -1.1 -1.1 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.7 2.2 3.0 3.0
UAE 1.4 2.7 2.9 3.2 5.0 6.2 9.3 8.0 6.4
It should be noted at this point that although all of the GCC consumer price indices 
show a clear upward trend over the last several years, measurement errors in official 
price indices are likely to underestimate inflation throughout the GCC. For example, 
Morgan-Stanley20 cites independent surveys suggesting an inflation rate of 15-25% in 
the UAE as opposed to the much lower official figures. “Given the extent of liquidity 
abundance and the mix of extremely accommodative macroeconomic policies, the 
behavior of non-tradable prices is the obvious culprit. But we should not overlook the 
19. “Countdown to Lift-Off,” The Economist, November 22, 2007, http://www.economist.com/finance/
displaystory.cfm?story_id=10191717.
20. Serhan Cevik, “Pegged Pains,” Morgan-Stanley Global Economic Forum, February 20, 2007, http://www.
morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070220-Tue.html#anchor4443.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007.
Notes: 2007 values are estimates; 2008 values are forecasts.
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role of imported inflation. Pegged to the dollar, the currencies of oil producers in the 
Middle East have tracked the dollar’s sustained depreciation since 2002, even as their 
export earnings have soared to record levels. And since the majority of imports come 
from Europe and Asia, the dollar’s weakness has become a major source of inflation 
by pushing up the price of imported goods and services.”21
 While higher import prices have contributed to increases in inflation in re-
cent years, varying inflation rates between the two groups of GCC economies largely 
reflect differences in the pace of increase in public spending and investment. As 
noted above, inflation was strongest in Qatar and the UAE, where population growth 
has outpaced the provision of accommodation resulting in a sharp increase in rents. 
Rental increases account for half of inflation in the UAE, overwhelming the mitigat-
ing effect of importing low-wage labor.22 
 For the UAE and Qatar, the normally prescribed policies of tighter monetary 
policy and higher interest rates to fight inflation would only lead to massive inflows 
to take advantage of the higher interest rates — the surge in demand for local GCC 
currencies would put upward pressure on the exchange rate that could conceivably 
collapse the peg. In short, under the current exchange rate system, the UAE and Qa-
tar are precluded from tightening monetary policy — normally and effective tool in 
combating inflationary pressures.
Figure 1: Inflation in the GCC Countries, 2000-2008 
(consumer price index; 2000=100)
21. Cevik, “Pegged Pains.” 
22. Sedat Di��men, “An Outlook to Upcoming GCC Monetary Union’s Obstacles,” Gulf investment House, 
December 12, 2006.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007.
Notes: 2007 values are estimates; 2008 values are forecasts.
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The example23 of Qatar is especially instructive. Currently the country is caught 
in a catch-22 in that it cannot reduce interest rates at the same pace as the US Federal 
Reserve due to high local liquidity and inflation. This situation is leading to a widen-
ing differential between US and Qatari interest rates and stimulating the inflow of 
increased liquidity. The resulting options would be to restrain liquidity by possibly 
raising bank-required reserve ratios, but these can only go so high. The other option 
is raising interest rates, which would only further speculation about de-pegging the 
riyal, again attracting a large inflow of funds hoping to benefit from a pending revalu-
ation.
As Qatar continues to see a steady rise in inflation, there will be increasing pres-
sure to de-peg the currency. The biggest question will remain whether to keep the dol-
lar peg and weather the current storm until the monetary union is formed or to make 
a move now to ease pressures until a monetary union is in place.24
DIFFICULTIES IN PREvENTING DESTABILIzING SPECULATIvE CAPITAL FLOWS
As noted above, even without interest, efforts to arbitrage the pegs are currently 
under considerable pressure due to speculative flows. While these flows have become 
a major worry of central bankers all over the Gulf, they are most pronounced in Qatar 
and the UAE. The problem came to a head in late 2007, when GCC governments did 
not immediately follow US interest rate decreases in September. Speculators saw this 
as a sign of an impending revaluation of their currencies. 
Other signs that further fueled speculator’s expectations of revaluation included:
•	 A Qatari statement that the country's sovereign wealth fund 
had reduced its dollar exposure by more than half to around 40%;
•	 Increasing calls, including one from the IMF, for revaluation 
and/or adoption of a currency basket instead of a dollar-only peg;
•	 GCC states' agreement in September that, notwithstanding 
their plans for monetary union by 2010, they would be allowed to 
pursue separate inflation policies; and
•	 Remarks by the head of the UAE central bank about the 
possible need for a revaluation and for tying the dirham to a 
currency basket.
Against this background, currency traders bet on a revaluation of GCC curren-
cies. Although several central banks decreased interest rates in November to conform 
to the US Federal Reserve moves, there was a widespread expectation that the GCC 
summit would pave the way for devaluation and a quick profit for the speculators. 
Instead, as noted above, it produced no statement at all on the issue. Clearly, as long as 
the pegs stay in place, speculative movements will flare up from time to time, making 
it even more difficult for central banks to control liquidity and ultimately the rate of 
domestic inflation.
23. “Qatar: To Peg or Not to Peg,” Oxford Business Group, December 10, 2007.
24. “Qatar: To Peg or Not to Peg.”
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ADvANTAGES OF MORE FLExIBLE ExCHANGE RATES IN THE 
GCC REGION
The main arguments against retaining pegged rates tend to be more theoretical 
than those stressing the status quo. Advocates of more exchange rate flexibility usu-
ally stress the role of exchange rates in absorbing shocks and relieving stress on the 
domestic economy. For example, Brad Setser25 contends that oil-exporting economies 
that now peg to the dollar would be better served by a currency regime that assures 
their currencies depreciate when the price of oil falls and appreciate when the price 
of oil rises — a pattern likely to exist during most times under a regime of floating 
exchange rates. He notes that those that are unprepared for a managed float should 
peg to a broader basket that includes the price of oil.
The logic for breaking the peg and adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime 
draws on the economic theory of shocks and balance of payments adjustment. Clas-
sic economic analysis differentiates between temporary and permanent shocks to 
the price of oil, as well as between supply and demand shocks. A temporary shock 
does not require adjustment. An oil-exporting economy should save the oil windfall 
rather than permanently increasing consumption and investment, while the oil-im-
porting economy should dip into its savings to cover a temporary rise in the price of 
oil rather than cutting back on its consumption and investment. 
On the other hand, a permanent rise in the price of oil, by contrast, allows higher 
levels of levels of consumption and investment in the oil-exporting economy and 
necessitates a lower level of consumption and investment in the oil-importing econ-
omy. A permanent shock should lead to strong economic expansion in oil-exporting 
economies and real appreciation of their currencies, while having the opposite effect 
on oil-importing economies. The movements in currency values would assist the 
restoration of balance of payments equilibrium while the appreciating currencies of 
the oil exporters would help suppress the inflationary impacts of increased domestic 
expenditures. 
In contrast to a system of flexible rates, the dollar peg is likely to produce an ex-
cessive amount of deflation or inflation as economies adjust from shocks since all the 
pressure for adjustment is placed on the domestic economy. As a specific example, an 
increase in the price of oil implies a temporary rise in inflation; a fall in the price of 
oil implies a period of deflation. Setser describes the process as follows:
Holding the nominal exchange rate constant and allowing all the 
real adjustment to come from changes in the price level has two 
important consequences. First the process of inflationary and/or 
deflationary adjustment is slow. Much of the rise in domestic 
prices associated with a rise in the oil price will come after the 
price of oil has stabili��ed. Moreover, once started, inflationary 
adjustment can develop its own momentum as economic agents 
anticipate rising rice levels and demand higher nominal wages. In 
some cases the resulting inflationary momentum pushed up the 
real exchange rate even after oil prices had turned down, setting 
25. Setser, The Case for Exchange Rate Flexibility in Oil-Exporting Economies. 
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the stage for a real overvaluation.26 
A typical scenario with fixed exchange rates begins with an increase in the price 
of oil. In turn, this leads to an increase in government revenue, spending, investment, 
and inflation. Because interest rates tend to adjust slowly, high inflation tends to result 
in negative real interest rates (the nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation). 
Fiscal and monetary policies turn expansionary at the same time. Negative real rates 
fuel a surge in speculative property investment. They potentially set the stage for a 
boom/bust cycle driven by an unsustainable surge in private investment, land specu-
lation, and an asset market bubble. The same dynamics also work in reverse: a fall in 
the oil price leads to a fall in revenue, a fall in spending, inflation, if not deflation and 
a rise in real interest rates.
In short, the sophisticated case against pegged exchange rates is that they contrib-
ute to highly pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies — inflations are likely to be higher 
and recessions more severe than would likely be the case under a system of flexible 
exchange rates.
ASSESSING THE OPTIONS
The GCC countries have experienced three rather distinct shocks in recent years: 
(a) a positive oil price shock; (b) the anchor currency — the US dollar being in a pro-
tracted and sharp descent; and (c) the US Federal Reserve’s policy being out of sync 
with the GCC’s needs. Among the several alternative regimes that have been men-
tioned in the previous sections, logical variants include: 
•	 A small revaluation of perhaps 3-5%, which could be the first 
of several steps of adjustment;
•	 A large revaluation of 20-30% that could take all speculative 
pressure of the currencies at once, as generally advocated by 
international economists; and
•	 The adoption of a currency basket in which the dollar would 
initially be given a dominant weight that could be progressively 
reduced.
•	 The adoption of flexible exchange rates.
The first two options, while possible, would not, as noted above, enable the coun-
tries to avoid many of the problems associated with the fixed peg currency. They 
might even create a more unstable situation of volatile capital inflows if speculators 
interpret the changes as signals that future revaluations were soon to be in the works.
Clearly, an abandonment of the dollar peg has geopolitical as well as economic 
ramifications. Shifts towards a looser peg by the GCC countries would contract the 
so- called “dollar ��one” — an area where countries settle their international transac-
tions and payments using the dollar. Currently, the de facto dollar ��one includes China, 
Japan, and many of the East Asian countries, as well as the oil-exporting members of 
26. Setser, The Case for Exchange Rate Flexibility in Oil-Exporting Economies, pp. 3-4.
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the GCC — in essence the two main blocs of balance-of-payments surplus.27 Clearly, 
a shift of this magnitude in the international system would have a negative impact 
on the value of the dollar. At best there would simply be a lower demand for dollars; 
at worst, there might be a stampede away from the dollar, resulting in a sudden and 
dramatic fall in its value. Reportedly, this possibility is a major factor behind Saudi 
Arabia’s reluctance to abandon the dollar peg.28
The third option, a currency basket perhaps along the lines of the one adopted by 
Kuwait in 2007, has its pros and cons. It would help stabili��e exchange rates but could 
still leave individual currencies divorced from price movements in oil markets. A 
variant might be to go to a mixed commodity basket that includes the export price of 
crude. However, with the establishment of a currency union only several years away, 
member countries might feel that to be the appropriate time to review and consider 
the advantages of such a major policy shift.
A managed free float always looks good in theory and on paper. As noted above, 
it has the advantages of relieving the domestic economy of some of the adjustments 
following shocks, but there is the operational issue of whether the GCC countries 
have the institutional framework to effectively implement this type of regime. As Jen 
and St-Arnaud note:
The best exchange rate regime for the GCC countries, in theory, 
is a managed float, in our opinion. However the main reason 
why the GCC are still contemplating various forms of pegs is 
the relatively ineffective monetary instruments that render an 
independent monetary policy a non-viable option at this point. 
This practical concern brings the GCC countries to square one 
of the debate: if the GCC need a peg of some form, a dollar peg 
is arguably no worse than other pegs. This is why there are still 
some members of the GCC for maintaining the dollar peg, as an 
interim regime.29
In any case, there are no signals suggesting that the GCC countries feel their 
monetary institutions and financial markets are at the point where the introduction 
of a flexible exchange rate regime would be a distinct improvement over the status 
quo.
Clearly, a factor to consider in any future exchange rate systems is their ability to 
facilitate the formation of the currency union, tentatively scheduled for 2010. In ad-
dition, the exchange rate regimes in place before that date will no doubt dictate the 
nature of the new common currency. 
In this regard, the countries have agreed to five criteria for a European Union-
27. For a discussion of the dollar ��one and its implications for the international value see Robert Looney, 
“The Iranian Oil Bourse: A Threat to Dollar Supremacy?” Challenge, Vol. 50, No. 2, March/April 2007, pp. 86-
109, http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/Rel-Challenge-07.pdf.
28. “Countdown to Lift-Off,” The Economist, November 22, 2007.
29. Stephen Jen and Charles St-Arnaud, “A Managed Float is the Ultimate Goal for the GCC,” 
Morgan Stanley Global Economic Forum, November 23, 2007, http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/
archive/2007/20071123-Fri.html#anchor5830.
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style economic union, including capping budgets at 3% of gross domestic product, 
capping public debt at 60% of GDP and inflation at the GCC average plus 2%. Interest 
rates are to be no higher than the average of the lowest three states plus 2% and coun-
tries must have foreign exchange reserves to cover four to six months of imports. As 
things stand, the existing dollar pegs may be the best system to meet these criteria.
Future trends in inflation and the value of the dollar are also prime considerations. 
By the time a Gulf monetary authority is in a position to review the dollar peg, the 
urge to drop it may be far less pressing. While inflation is a concern now, this may not 
be the case in 2010. For one thing, the current wave of major expenditures will have 
passed, allowing supply bottlenecks to be alleviated. Countries like the UAE are tar-
geting the rental market for major expansions to relieve the inflationary pressures in 
that segment of the economy. This should produce a significant drop in that country’s 
inflation.30
While the future value of the dollar is just about impossible to predict, one thing 
is certain — it will not continue its downward slide indefinitely. For one thing, this 
would set off a major recession in the EU as that region’s products are priced out of 
international markets. This effect would be reinforced if China retains its quasi peg 
to the dollar. There is also a certain resiliency in the dollar that is often overlooked31 
— clearly if the dollar were to stabili��e or regain some of its lost value, there would be 
even fewer reasons to abandon the peg. 
Perhaps Lidstone sums it up best: “There are big advantages to being pegged, after 
all. For a start you don’t have to do anything (in terms of monetary policy). And you 
can take advantage of hedging instruments and other aspects of dollar markets the 
world over. In the end it may prove easier for the GCC states to stick with the devil 
they know.”32
30. Lidstone, “Fixed Ideas,” pp. 4-5.
31. “Dollar Likely to Remain Resilient,” Oxford Analytica, May 30, 2006.
32. Lidstone, “Fixed Ideas,” pp. 4-5.
Looney.indd   13 1/7/2008   8:51:11 AM
